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ABSTRACT
The CRISPR/Cas9 genome engineering platform is the first
method of gene editing that could potentially be used to treat
genetic disorders in human embryos. No past therapies, genetic
or otherwise, have been intended or used to treat disorders in
existent embryos. Past procedures performed on embryos have
exclusively involved creation and implantation (e.g., in-vitro
fertilization) or screening and selection of already-healthy
embryos (e.g., preimplantation genetic diagnosis). A
CRISPR/Cas9 treatment would evade medical malpractice law
due to the early stage of the intervention and the fact that it is not
a treatment for the mother. In most jurisdictions, medical
professionals owe no duty to pre-viable fetuses or embryos as
such, but will be held liable for negligent treatment of the mother
if the treatment causes injury to a born-alive child. This issue
brief discusses the science of CRISPR/Cas9, the background legal
status of human embryos, and the case for considering genetically
engineered embryos as patients for purposes of medical
malpractice law.

INTRODUCTION
Fernando and Pilar Ruiz hail from the shores of Lake Maracaibo
in Venezuela, where almost 1% of the population is affected by
Huntington’s disease,1 a rare and incurable genetic disorder.2 While Pilar
is healthy, Fernando is not so fortunate. Both of his parents died from
Huntington’s, and Fernando carries two copies of the deadly Huntington’s
gene. Since inheriting only one copy is sufficient to pass on the disease,3
†
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1
How Common Is Huntington’s Disease (HD)?, HUNTINGTON’S NEW S. WALES,
http://www.huntingtonsnsw.org.au/information/hd-facts/how-common
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2017).
2
See Sara Imarisio et al., Huntington’s Disease: From Pathology and Genetics to
Potential Therapies, 412 BIOCHEMICAL J. 191, 191, 200 (2008) (discussing basic
features of the disease and treatment options).
3
Id.
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Fernando cannot have healthy children, and the couple is distraught over
the prospect that Fernando will die childless.
No current technological measures can solve the Ruizes’
predicament, but the promise of surmounting this sort of obstacle to
bearing healthy children is closer to reality than ever before in the form of
a new gene editing technology called CRISPR/Cas9.4 The CRISPR/Cas9
technology promises the ability to specifically target and shut down or
replace genes in human embryos.5 Particular sections of DNA with
disease-causing genes can be replaced with healthy copies of the genes,
curing some genetic diseases.6 Furthermore, unlike contemporary gene
therapies performed on adults, CRISPR/Cas9 would alter the germline of
its embryonic targets, not just the somatic or non-reproductive-cell DNA:
the eventual children of individuals treated as embryos would inherit the
healthy, altered gene.7 Contemporary gene therapies, which edit the
genome to attenuate or cure genetic disease, alter only somatic cell DNA,
so the children of gene therapy recipients could still express or carry the
disease. But germline editing, if broadly accessible, could eliminate entire
genetic diseases. The technology will not be ready for clinical use in
human embryos before ethical8 and methodological9 issues are resolved,
but its significant curative potential is already being recognized
throughout the scientific community.10
While the science of CRISPR/Cas9 has been blazing a new trail
in therapeutic potential, the development of the law governing the
4

See Tetsuya Ishii, Germ Line Genome Editing in Clinics: The Approaches,
Objectives and Global Society, 16 BRIEFINGS IN FUNCTIONAL GENOMICS 46, 48
(2017) (“[F]urther research will likely make germ line genome editing clinically
feasible in the near future.”).
5
See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT ON
HUMAN GENE EDITING: A GLOBAL DISCUSSION 1–2 (2015) (describing the
promise of CRISPR/Cas9 and the potential applications of human germline
editing).
6
See id. at 2 (discussing cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Huntington’s
disease).
7
Id.
8
Ethical objections involve, for example, concern for the moral status of the
embryo, rising inequality, and potential eugenic applications. Id. at 4.
9
See Rongxue Peng, Guigao Lin & Jinming Li, Potential Pitfalls of
CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Editing, 283 FEBS J. 1218, 1223, 1226–27
(2016) (discussing off-target effects, low homology-directed repair rates, and
agent delivery difficulties).
10
See generally Katrine S. Bosley et al., CRISPR Germline Engineering—The
Community Speaks, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 478 (2015) (compiling expert
opinions on the potential and ethics of germline editing).
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treatment of preimplantation human embryos has lagged behind.11
Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are regulated much more
lightly—and inconsistently from state to state—than the prevalence of
their use and the depth of the interests at stake demand.12 Neither Congress
nor most state legislatures are particularly willing to regulate ARTs, as the
question of the legal status of the embryo is highly politically polarizing.13
One possible method of regulation in the face of legislative
inaction is to proceed by the common law. For example, some state courts
have applied property law or contract law to novel disputes involving
unimplanted embryos created by ART.14 Such extensions of common law
doctrines and statutory law to cover new situations are well-meaning
efforts to provide a remedy for unaddressed but wrongful acts.
However, as treatments like CRISPR/Cas9 become available, the
inadequacy of these patchwork efforts as an overall regulatory regime for
the ART industry15 will become more apparent. CRISPR/Cas9 promises
the first therapy intended to cure disease in human embryos, aimed at
allowing those embryos to develop into disease-free members of society.
This course of therapy, unlike the ARTs that have come before it, treats
the embryos (not just the parents) as patients. The proper basic legal
principle to govern embryonic treatment with CRISPR/Cas9 ought to be
the same that governs other doctor-patient relationships.

I. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
A. A Quick Introduction to ART and Human Genetics
Every human begins his or her life as a single cell, a union of
sperm and egg called a zygote.16 After the egg is fertilized, the new zygote
divides, each of the two new cells divides, and so on; at this point, the
entity is called a cleavage-stage embryo.17 After a few days, the embryo
implants in the uterine wall, as its cells continue to divide and specialize

11

Catherine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331, 331 (2009).
12
Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology):
Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 64–65 (2004).
13
Id. at 73–75.
14
Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human Reproductive
Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts, 23 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 103, 104 (1998).
15
Id.
16
T.W. SADLER, LANGMAN’S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 10 (12th ed. 2012).
17
Fernando J. Prados, Sophie Debrock, Josephine G. Lemmen & Inge Agerholm,
The Cleavage Stage Embryo, 27 HUM. REPROD. (SUPPLEMENT 1) i50, i50 (2012).
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into various tissues.18 At the end of its eighth week of life, the embryo
becomes classified as a fetus and remains so until birth.19
ARTs are used to create zygotes outside the mother’s uterus and
implant them within it, often because conventional reproduction is
unavailing.20 The most common procedure is in vitro fertilization (IVF): a
fertility doctor extracts egg cells from the patient or a donor, fertilizes them
in the lab with sperm cells from the sperm donor, allows the embryos to
grow, and deposits them in the patient’s uterus in the hope that at least one
will successfully implant and develop into a healthy baby.21 Techniques
used to supplement traditional IVF include intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI),22 a way to compensate for low male fertility by injecting
the sperm directly into the egg, and preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD), a technique for diagnosing genetic disease in embryos so that only
healthy embryos can be implanted.23
The adult human body is composed of trillions of small cells, and
(with a few exceptions) every cell contains all the genetic information that
the zygote contained.24 This information is encoded in deoxyribonucleic
acid, or DNA, a double-stranded molecule arranged in a double helix
conformation.25 Each strand consists of a series of sugar molecular units
stuck to one another in a chain, with one of four nucleotide bases—
adenine, thymine, cytosine, or guanine, commonly abbreviated A, T, C,
and G—attached to each sugar unit, sticking out toward the other strand,
and meeting another base in the middle.26 The bases pair up according to
a specific pattern—A bonds only with T, and C with G—due to their
respective chemical bonding properties.27 The strands are considered

18

SADLER, supra note 16, at 38–39.
Id. at 96.
20
Noah Baron & Jennifer Bazzell, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 15 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 57, 57–58 (2014).
21
Id. at 58–59.
22
Id. at 59.
23
Id. at 91–92.
24
A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.genome.gov/18016863/a-brief-guide-to-genomics; Rose Eveleth,
There Are 37.2 Trillion Cells in Your Body, SMITHSONIAN: SMARTNEWS,
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/there-are-372-trillion-cells-inyour-body-4941473 (last updated Oct. 24, 2013).
25
ROBERT SCHLEIF, GENETICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 22–23 (2d ed. 1993).
26
Id. at 22.
27
Id. at 22–23.
19
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complementary: each strand acts as a template to make a copy of the other,
allowing each cell to replicate itself accurately.28
A typical human cell’s DNA is contained in 46 chromosomes,
arranged in 23 homologous pairs; one chromosome in each pair is
inherited from each parent.29 Each chromosome contains stretches of
DNA, called genes, which instruct other cellular mechanisms to produce
certain proteins, which do the work of the cell.30 Changing the sequence
of the gene—for instance, replacing one base with another, or deleting or
inserting bases—will often change the function of the protein.31
DNA instructions are read by a protein called RNA polymerase,
which creates a single-stranded transcript of the gene out of ribonucleic
acid, or RNA.32 RNA, like DNA, consists of a sugar backbone and a
sequence of bases; an RNA transcript of a DNA sequence consists of a
complementary sequence, which binds strongly to the template DNA
sequence.33 This transcript then travels to the ribosome, the cell’s protein
factory, which creates the encoded protein.34
When DNA-copying mechanisms miscopy a gene, by changing,
adding, or deleting bases, the changes in the encoded protein can cause it
to function incorrectly.35 Any individual mutation occurring in a single
adult somatic cell will often be harmless; in fact, adult cells accumulate a
large number of mutations steadily over time.36 But if the mutation is
present in a gamete—a sperm or egg cell—every cell of the person who
develops from the mutated cell will have this germline genetic mutation,
which could cause a genetic disease.37 Germline genome editing could
solve this problem entirely by replacing a diseased gene with a healthy
copy in an embryo.38
28

Id. at 2.
SADLER, supra note 16, at 11.
30
Id. at 3.
31
SCHLEIF, supra note 25, at 228–29.
32
Id. at 85–86.
33
Id. at 22, 85.
34
Id. at 86.
35
Id. at 228–29.
36
Francis Blokzijl et al., Tissue-Specific Mutation Accumulation in Human Adult
Stem Cells during Life, 538 NATURE 260, 260 (2016); see also ANTHONY
GRIFFITHS ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 456 (8th ed. 2005)
(“Many point mutations within noncoding sequences elicit little or no phenotypic
change . . . .”).
37
See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 36, at 376–77 (describing the difference
between somatic and germline gene therapy).
38
Id.
29
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B. How CRISPR/Cas9 Works
CRISPR/Cas9 is a molecular complex consisting of the Cas9
protein and a short RNA molecule.39 The RNA molecule is
complementary to a target DNA sequence, which it seeks out and binds to
when inserted into a cell.40 Once the RNA has bound to the target DNA,
the attached Cas9 protein cuts both strands of the DNA molecule.41 The
cell then uses one of two methods to repair the cut.42 One method, nonhomologous end joining, often inserts or deletes genetic material in the
process of repair and is likely to stop the gene from functioning.43
CRISPR/Cas9 can thus be used to “knock out” problem genes. Another
method, homology-directed repair, involves the cell inserting some freefloating genetic material into the break.44 Introducing CRISPR/Cas9 along
with a DNA molecule carrying a gene of interest can thus insert the new
gene at the target site.45
The CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing technology was developed from
a bacterial adaptive immune system, which bacteria use to fight off viral
infection.46 CRISPRs (clustered, regularly interspaced short palindromic
repeats) are short stretches of bacterial DNA, interspaced along the single
bacterial chromosome by virus-derived, spacer-DNA sequences.47 Several
cas (CRISPR-associated) genes, located close to the CRISPR sequences,
play different roles in operating or managing the CRISPR adaptive

See Kristin Beale, The CRISPR Patent Battle: Who Will Be “Cut” Out of Patent
Rights to One of the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of Our Generation?, B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., Feb. 2016, at 3.
40
Id. at 2–3.
41
Id. at 3.
42
GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 36, at 472.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 473 (describing homology-directed repair as it typically occurs in
nature, where the sister chromatid provides the repair template).
45
Beale, supra note 39, at 3.
46
Luciano A. Marraffini & Erik J. Sontheimer, CRISPR Interference: RNADirected Adaptive Immunity in Bacteria and Archaea, 11 NATURE REVS.
GENETICS 181, 181 (2010); see also Richard Warringon, Wade Watson, Harold
L. Kim & Francesca Romana Antonetti, An Introduction to Immunology and
Immunopathology, 7 ALLERGY, ASTHMA & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY
(SUPPLEMENT 1) 1, 1 (2011) (stating that adaptive immunity is targeted at specific
invading pathogens, as opposed to innate immunity, which excludes foreign
material in general).
47
Marraffini & Sontheimer, supra note 46, at 181–82.
39
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immune system.48 Some of these genes function to append short sections
of foreign DNA, derived from infecting viruses or plasmids,49 to the
CRISPR site as spacers.50 Another of these genes codes for the Cas9
protein, a programmable nuclease51 that forms a complex with crRNA
(CRISPR RNA, transcribed from spacer DNA) to identify and cut foreign
DNA at the sequence complementary to the complexed RNA.52 When a
virus infects a Cas9-equipped bacterium,53 the bacterium first incorporates
a segment of viral DNA into its CRISPR site as a spacer, rather than at a
more dangerous site for the bacterium.54 It then creates a crRNA transcript
from the newly incorporated spacer DNA, which forms a complex with
the Cas9 protein to identify and cut the DNA of the invading viruses in
order to fight off the infection.55
While the natural function of Cas9 is chiefly immunity, its
laboratory applications are numerous and multiplying.56 Since Cas9 can
easily be programmed to target any short DNA sequence and introduce a
break in the DNA strand,57 it has been used to modify the function of
numerous genes in many different species and cell types, including various
types of human cells.58 Even more promisingly, supplementing the process
by introducing exogenous donor DNA, which contains a sequence to be
inserted, bookended with sequences homologous to those on both sides of
48

Devashish Rath, Lina Amlinger, Archana Rath & Magnus Lundgren, The
CRISPR-Cas Immune System: Biology, Mechanisms and Applications, 117
BIOCHIMIE 119, 119 (2015).
49
Plasmids are free-floating molecules of DNA that bacteria can absorb and
incorporate into their own genomes.
50
Rath et al., supra note 48, at 119–20.
51
A nuclease is a type of protein that cuts nucleic acids such as DNA.
52
Rath et al., supra note 48, at 121.
53
Viruses are made of protein and genetic material. They infect bacteria by
injecting their genetic material into the bacterium. This material gets incorporated
into the bacterial genome, which then instructs the cell to make more copies of
the virus. These new viruses can leave the cell and infect other bacteria. Craig
Pringle, Overview of Viral Infections, MERCK MANUALS, http://www.merck
manuals.com/home/infections/viral-infections/overview-of-viral-infections (last
visited Apr. 23, 2017).
54
Rath et al., supra note 48, at 119.
55
Id. at 120.
56
Id. at 125–26.
57
See Alex Reis, Breton Hornblower, Brett Robb & George Tzertzinis,
CRISPR/Cas9 and Targeted Genome Editing: A New Era in Molecular Biology,
2014 NEB EXPRESSIONS, no. 1, at 3, 4. Wild type Cas9 creates double strand
breaks in target DNA. Modified forms of Cas9 can create single strand breaks or
bind to DNA without creating a break. Id.
58
Rath et al., supra note 48, at 126.
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the Cas9-induced break, results in homology-directed repair inserting the
donor sequence at the site of the break.59 The core of Cas9’s therapeutic
promise is this ability to make breaks, at essentially any site in the genome,
that donor DNA can fill.

C. CRISPR/Cas9 Potentially Allows Editing Embryos in
Clinical Medicine, but Hurdles Remain
The CRISPR/Cas9 system promises to be the first gene-editing
platform with enough specificity, efficiency, and development potential to
become a clinical gene therapy for human embryos.60 Prior to the
development of CRISPR/Cas9, the most effective gene-editing
technologies—zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs) and transcription-activator
like effector nucleases (TALENs)—required redesign of the DNA-protein
interface for every new target, making them expensive to develop for
specific gene sequences.61 CRISPR/Cas9 is different: since the Cas9
protein remains constant between uses, and only the guide RNA needs to
be changed to target a new gene, the system is much cheaper to use and
experiment with than the older alternatives.62 This reduction in price has
democratized gene-editing technology and prompted a flurry of research
activity, leading to numerous improvements and additional uses for
CRISPR/Cas9.63
The most controversial use to which CRISPR/Cas9 has been put
to date occurred in 2015 in China, where researchers tried to use the

59

See id. A sequence is homologous to another if the two match or nearly match.
Essentially, this feature allows any “insertion, deletion, or change in [DNA]
sequence” nearly anywhere in the genome. Id.
60
See id. (claiming that CRISPR/Cas9 “could be used to alter DNA in human
embryos to prevent non-complex hereditary diseases”); see also Jennifer A.
Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Genome Engineering
with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1258096-1, 1258096-4 (2014) (“CRISPR-Cas9
represents an efficient tool to edit the genomes of human cells.” (citations
omitted)); Anna Zaret, Note, Editing Embryos: Considering Restrictions on
Genetically Engineering Humans, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1805, 1808 (2016) (“With
[CRISPR/Cas9] it is increasingly likely that embryos will one day be edited and
used to create genetically modified humans.”).
61
Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-3.
62
Ishii, supra note 4, at 3.
63
See Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-3. Clinical trials for
therapies created with the in vitro use of CRISPR/Cas9 are currently underway,
and more are planned. Sara Reardon, First CRISPR Clinical Trial Gets Green
Light from US Panel, NATURE (June 22, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/
first-crispr-clinical-trial-gets-green-light-from-us-panel-1.20137.
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platform to edit the genomes of human zygotes.64 Though the zygotes used
in the study were terminally defective and would not have developed
beyond the blastocyst stage in any case,65 the study prompted an outcry
from the worldwide scientific community. Many scientists called for a
global moratorium on clinical editing of human embryos until the
international community settled on regulatory guidelines.66
Despite the limited efficacy of the first attempt to edit human
embryos, the scientific community remains largely convinced that the
CRISPR/Cas9 system will develop into a clinically useful tool for
germline editing.67 The rate at which gene editing fails or goes awry,
introducing unforeseen and harmful changes in the genome of the targeted
cell, is still far too high to introduce CRISPR/Cas9 into clinical use in
embryos just yet.68 But the speed of technological improvement, which
comes from the sheer number of scientists working with and tweaking the
cheap and easy-to-use system, promises to improve this rate over time.69
Whether the regulatory environment will be ready for clinical embryo
editing, or whether it will repeat the missteps of prior attempts to regulate
ARTs, remains to be seen.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Sources and Circumstances of Liability for Injuries to a
Preborn Child or Embryo
Whatever form of regulation eventually governs fertility clinics’
use of gene editing technology ought to compensate children who were
injured as embryos through negligently performed gene editing. In all
64

David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify
Human Embryos, NATURE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/
chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-human-embryos-1.17378.
65
Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human
Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363, 363 (2015).
66
Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE 410,
411 (2015), http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.171
11.
67
See Bosley et al., supra note 10, at 479; COMM. ON HUMAN GENE EDITING,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. & NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING:
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 89),
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24623/human-genome-editing-science-ethics-andgovernance (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (“[T]he efficiency and accuracy of
targeting can be extremely high, and there are sound reasons for believing that
off-target effects can be greatly reduced . . . .”).
68
Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 64.
69
See Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-4 (citing several variants
of the technology developed for various applications).
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American jurisdictions, a child who is injured prenatally and later born
alive can recover tort damages.70 Although some older case law seemed to
restrict recovery to cases in which the child was injured after attaining
viability, the majority of jurisdictions now allow recovery for injuries
sustained at any point between conception and birth.71 Even more, some
jurisdictions recognize preconception torts, in which a child can recover
even when she had not yet been conceived at the time the tortious breach
of duty occurred.72
Courts that have recognized preconception torts have done so by
reading the duty requirement broadly, as a public policy determination that
liability is appropriate in certain circumstances. One court, recognizing a
preconception cause of action for a child injured because of negligent
surgery performed on the mother’s uterus before the child’s conception,
employed the following analogy:73
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later, a
mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and it gives
way, causing serious injury to both the mother and the child. It would
be ludicrous to suggest that only the mother would have a cause of
action against the builder but, because the infant was not conceived
at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed toward
the child.74

In this case, the child was not only a member of the class of people
foreseeably affected by the surgeon’s negligence, but also a third-party
beneficiary of the doctor-patient relationship.75 Finding a duty thus
comported with already-accepted principles of tort law.
Courts that have refused to recognize preconception torts have
tended to read the duty requirement as something owed to a particular

70

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Matthew
Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a
Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2560 (2001).
71
Browne, supra note 70, at 2560–61. But see Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d
363, 370 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (disallowing recovery for injuries sustained after
conception but prior to implantation, since no duty exists to a pre-implantation
embryo).
72
See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977);
Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994).
73
Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 789.
74
Id. (quoting Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo.
1993)).
75
Id.
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person in existence at the time of the breaching act.76 Policy rationales for
this reading have included a desire not to extend liability to remote
injuries, even foreseeable ones. In the medical context, imposing liability
could result in conflicts of interest between patients and their potential
future children, leading to the practice of “defensive medicine,” in which
doctors act to minimize their chance of being sued rather than in their
patient’s best interests.77
The question of whether embryos or fetuses count as persons, to
whom duties in general are owed, is a thorny one. Only one state,
Louisiana, recognizes human embryos created through in vitro
fertilization (IVF) as juridical persons,78 but many other states recognize
duties to in utero embryos and fetuses regardless of live birth. For instance,
the wrongful death laws of the majority of the states recognize the claims
of viable fetuses who die before birth, and a few states recognize such
claims for any fetus or implanted embryo, regardless of viability.79 No
state recognizes a wrongful death claim for an embryo stored outside the
body of the mother;80 when an Illinois trial court once interpreted the
state’s wrongful death statute to include such embryos, the appellate court
reversed, reading the legislative history of the statute as restricting its
scope to embryos and fetuses in utero.81

B. When a Medical Practitioner’s Duty of Care to an Embryo
or Fetus Arises
In the medical malpractice context, a duty arises from the
existence of a physician-patient relationship.82 In the fertility clinic
76

Browne, supra note 70, at 2596–97.
See Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981) (refusing to
find a duty to the later-conceived child of a woman on whom an abortion was
negligently performed, resulting in injury to the later child).
78
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2015).
79
See generally Jill D. Washburn Helbling, To Recover or Not To Recover: A
State by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996)
(detailing which states recognize a cause of action for fetal wrongful death).
80
See Maria Pellegrino, Murder in A Petri Dish? The Wrath of Illinois’ Miller v.
American Infertility Group: A Push for Legislative Action, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S
L.J. 137, 137 (2005) (claiming that a wrongful death cause of action for a
preimplantation embryo is “without precedent in any jurisdiction”).
81
Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., S.C., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839, 845 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008). The appellate decision was primarily premised on principles of
statutory interpretation (for example, construing the wrongful death statute
narrowly due to its derogation of the common law) rather than the policy
implications of extending wrongful death liability to preimplantation embryos. Id.
82
Johnson v. Thompson, 650 S.E.2d 322, 323 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
77
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context, before an embryo is implanted, only the mother is generally
considered a patient for purposes of this relationship. After implantation,
physicians providing prenatal care have a duty to both the mother and the
fetus, due to the fetus’s presence in utero.83
This limitation on duty would seem to foreclose the possibility of
preconception medical provider torts, since every physician-patient
relationship requires a patient to exist. As a general rule, if a duty does not
exist to a person (or class of persons, of whom the injured party is a
member) at the time a wrongful act or omission occurred, the person
cannot recover for injuries that the wrong caused.84 Despite this traditional
limitation, twelve jurisdictions, out of sixteen that have considered the
issue, have either found liability for preconception torts or indicated that
such liability might be appropriate in some circumstances.85 These courts
have generally found such liability because it was reasonably foreseeable,
in the cases considered, that the as-yet-unconceived children would be
harmed by the defendants’ breach of a medical duty to another person, the
mother.86 Some courts have justified this expansion of duty, specifically
in the medical context, by analogizing it to third-party beneficiary liability
in contract.87
While the maternal nexus of duty serves well to compensate the
victims of the forms of preconception torts that have been recognized,
courts have been reticent to completely unmoor the duty analysis from any
specific person in existence at the time of the breaching act.88 The courts’
unwillingness to recognize either a direct preimplantation duty to human
embryos or a theory of third-party harm that does not rely on a breach of
See id. at 324 (holding that a prenatal care provider had a duty to a fetus “while
he was in utero”); Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. 1998) (“[A] fetus
can be a patient.”). In some jurisdictions, despite the existence of this medical
provider duty, breaches are only actionable if the child is born alive. See HCA,
Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 195 n.21 (Tex. App. 2000), aff'd, 118 S.W.3d 758
(Tex. 2003).
84
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–100 (N.Y. 1928).
85
Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REV.
315, 320 (1997).
86
See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977).
Renslow involved a case of Rh sensitization, a medical phenomenon causing no
injury to the mother but foreseeably harming her future children, caused by
medical negligence. Id. at 1251.
87
See, e.g., Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594–95 (Ind. 1992).
88
Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1255; see also Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal.
Rptr. 85, 89 (Ct. App. 1991), reh’g denied and opinion modified (Oct. 23, 1991)
(suggesting that a duty to not-yet-conceived children can arise out of a special
relationship with the mother).
83
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duty to the mother leaves a gap in the law. A breach of duty to the mother
before the child is created, causing injury to the child, is compensable, as
is a breach of duty to the pregnant mother causing similar injuries to the
child. But technologies like CRISPR/Cas9, the use of which would
constitute a treatment for the embryonic child and not the mother, fit
within neither of these recognized duties.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Distinction Between CRISPR/Cas9 and Contemporary ARTs
Regarding Tort Liability
Imposing tort liability to regulate ART use has met with several
obstacles. The problem to be addressed is that ARTs are risky for the
children created and often cause injury to them.89 But the unique point in
the child’s life at which the ART intervention occurs makes applying
traditional tort concepts difficult.
The basic objections to tort liability in the ART context take three
main forms. First is the problem of non-identity: since medical duties are
generally owed to persons in existence at the time a breach occurred, no
liability to a person would attach to an act, such as IVF, that creates that
person.90 Second, regardless of what the child’s injury is, ART
practitioners are not net-liable for it because their negligent act conferred
a net benefit, life itself, on the child.91 Third, creating a duty to persons not
yet in existence is properly a decision for a democratically elected
legislature, rather than a court.92
A clinical CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing treatment could avoid these
limits on liability, due to its differences from currently available ARTs.
An example course of treatment for illustrating these differences could
comprise IVF, introduction of the targeted Cas9 nuclease and donor DNA
89

Rosato, supra note 12, at 76. Fertility treatments tend to create multiple births
and are responsible for nearly all the especially dangerous, highly multiple
pregnancies that occur (for example, the “Octomom.”). Alison Stateman, The
Fertility Doctor Behind the “Octomom,” TIME (Mar. 7, 2009), http://content.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883663,00.html.
90
Browne, supra note 70, at 2555.
91
Id. at 2555–56. For instance, if a fertility doctor negligently chooses to perform
an intracytoplasmic sperm injection, a method of directly injecting the sperm into
the egg, rather than conventional IVF, the injured child would have no cause of
action, since choosing IVF would have resulted in a different sperm fertilizing the
egg and a different person in the plaintiff’s shoes. See id. at 2587 (“The benefit
rule poses an insurmountable challenge to plaintiffs who have the negligent act of
the defendant to thank for their very existence.”).
92
Id. at 2556.
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sequence to the in vitro zygote, and implantation of the lab-grown, treated
embryo.
Regarding the limitations on duty: once the IVF occurs, a unique
human organism is created, to which a duty could conceivably attach (for
purposes of subsequent medical treatments, like CRISPR/Cas9) without
expanding the universe of duty too broadly, e.g., to nonexistent or merely
imaginable persons. In fact, such an expansion of duty would be miniscule.
Since all jurisdictions recognize a duty to embryos and fetuses in utero,
recognizing the same duty ex utero would not require any great leaps of
judicial moral philosophy or special legislative policy determinations.93
The only salient difference between embryos currently owed duties and
embryos owed this proposed new duty would be the embryo’s location—
inside or outside of the uterus. The limitations on duty that currently apply
to embryos and fetuses, perhaps requiring attainment of viability or live
birth before liability attaches, would apply to this proposed duty as well.
Regarding the offsetting-benefit limitation on injury: treatment
with Cas9 is a medical intervention designed to improve the health of an
already-existing embryo, more akin to surgery performed on a fetus in
utero than IVF. Since the hypothetical negligently performed act—gene
editing with CRISPR/Cas9—would not be the act that created the embryo,
the resulting harm is measured not against nonexistence, but against the
outcome in which a non-negligently performed gene edit would have
resulted in the child being healthy.
Recognizing a duty that flows directly to the embryo, not merely
by way of the mother, is necessary to make negligent gene editing
compensable as a tort against the child. Since CRISPR/Cas9 would be a
treatment for the embryo rather than the mother and would involve no
medical intervention implicating the mother’s health,94 the physician
would be under no duty to perform the procedure in accordance with a
standard of care if his only duty were to the mother. The theories of duty
that have underlain successful claims of post-implantation or preconception torts are not applicable here, since both of those theories
93

Although the duty proposed here would run directly to the embryo, in a break
with the derivative-duty regime of the status quo, such a change would not create
liability in many additional cases. Due to the ethical questions surrounding
germline gene editing, these cases are likely to be rare for quite some time.
94
The mother could be harmed by her physician’s implanting a negligently edited
embryo, which would be a breach of duty. But in that circumstance, the relevant
act that the physician could be duty-bound to perform non-negligently would be
the implantation, not the CRISPR/Cas9 treatment. Because implantation is a
necessary step in embryonic development, the offsetting-benefit limitation on
liability could preclude recovery for the child if the duty to the child is derivative
of that to the mother.
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require a duty nexus running through the mother, who is the patient in the
physician-patient relationship. No such nexus exists here; if tort law will
compensate the children harmed by negligent genetic engineering, it will
do so by finding a duty owed to them directly, which can be breached other
than by means of a breach of duty to their mothers.

B. Policy Rationale Supporting a Doctor-Patient Duty to
Embryos Treated with CRISPR/Cas9
Finding a duty to edited embryos is consistent with the
development of tort duties to unborn children, as well as with tort law’s
aim of compensation for injuries. Over the last century, courts have
recognized that children deserve compensation for injuries, resulting from
the wrongful acts of others, that were suffered before their birth.95 Some
jurisdictions have extended this principle to wrongful acts that occurred
before the conception of the child, so long as a duty to the child’s mother
was breached and injury to future children was foreseeable from the nature
of the breach. Therefore, a child who is injured by a wrongful act
committed after implantation can recover, as can (in some jurisdictions) a
child whose gamete-precursor was still a part of its mother when a certain
type of wrongful act, usually reproductive-medical malpractice, was
committed. But a child injured as an in vitro embryo is barred from
recovery at the outset under a strict no-duty rule.
Even in jurisdictions that do not recognize pre-conception torts,
drawing the line of liability at implantation rather than conception is
arbitrary and outdated. There is no reason to restrict compensation for
injuries caused to an embryo, which was in existence at the time of a
negligent act, based on whether the act occurred before or after the embryo
was implanted. There is an identifiable human organism in both scenarios
to whom harm is foreseeable in the event of medical negligence. And such
a duty is appropriate as applied to edited embryos intended for
implantation. Nothing about the ex utero location of these embryos makes
their injuries less properly compensable (perhaps assuming the embryos
develop into children who are born alive, depending on jurisdiction) than
those of embryos injured in utero.
Finding a duty to edited embryos also serves tort law’s aim of
deterring wrongful acts.96 Such deterrence is especially necessary in the
brave new world of therapeutic germline editing, where one negligent edit
95

Browne, supra note 70, at 2560.
See Edward A. Marshall, Note, Medical Malpractice in the New Eugenics:
Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine To Provide Relief When Gene Therapy Fails,
35 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1323–26 (2001) (discussing the level of deterrence
necessary to ensure that germ line gene editing is performed with reasonable care).
96
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could lead to generations of inherited disease.97 To deny that fertility
doctors have any duty of care, when performing a procedure that could
introduce entirely new modifications with unforeseeable effects to the
gene pool, boggles the mind. Imposing tort liability on fertility doctors
who practice gene editing would effectually deter, in the gene-editing
context, the reckless experimentation that has been made possible by the
veritable Wild West98 of unregulated fertility-clinic practice. (Imagine the
fertility doctor responsible for the “Octomom” creating designer babies in
a petri dish.)
One possible alternative theory of duty for achieving these aims
bears addressing: if an ex utero embryo is the property of the parents,
injuries due to negligent gene editing could be compensable as the result
of a breach of duty to the parents not to negligently damage their
property.99 This framing avoids the thorny issue of attaching tort duties,
which we normally reserve for interactions between persons, directly to
human embryos in their capacity as human individuals at an early stage of
development.
Despite this benefit, the property framing is an inappropriate
response to the problem raised. A claim for injuries sustained due to
negligent gene editing is properly the child’s, rather than the parents’. The
damages sought are not compensation for the breakage of the parents’
pristine embryo; they are intended to compensate a child who lives with a
severe genetic disease or any number of unpredictable maladies due to
gene editing gone awry. The duty should be owed to the person for whose
benefit the law operates.
The cases in which property law has been applied to human
embryos are inapposite, as they have generally involved ownership (or
custody) contests between parents, not injuries to children.100 In these
cases, whether the embryos would be implanted at all was subject to
adjudication, and thus potential injury to the resulting children was far
afield of the issues discussed. In contrast, therapeutic gene editing would
always be intended to prepare embryos for implantation, so this context
suggests recognizing a duty flowing directly to the tiny human the law is
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Lanphier et al., supra note 66, at 410.
Clements, supra note 11, at 347–48.
99
See generally Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property
Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) (discussing
the role of property law in governing categorization of embryos and fetuses).
100
See id. at 160–61 (listing cases in which property concepts have been applied
to embryos).
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trying to protect rather than shoehorning embryos into property categories
merely to evade an unjust result.
Another alleged benefit of the property framing is its avoidance of
conflict with abortion law.101 If embryos are owed duties that resemble
those owed to persons, the rationale for preferring a mother’s right to an
abortion over embryos’ and fetuses’ rights is supposedly weakened; if
embryos are property, no conflict emerges. But the expansion of duty
proposed herein would not affect abortion rights, since medical providers
already have a duty not to wrongfully harm the implanted unborn children
of their patients. Recognizing a duty not to wrongfully harm the conceived,
but not yet implanted, unborn child of a patient would not affect lawfully
performed abortions at all—all abortions are performed on the mothers of
already-implanted unborn children, and abortions that comply with
applicable law are, by definition, not considered wrongful acts by law.
Once a duty is recognized, other aspects of tort liability will need
to be adapted to the gene-editing context. The need to prove the other
requirements of relevant tort law—noncompliance with a standard of care,
causation, and damages—will present unique challenges in the germline
editing context. Clinical germline editing practice could organically
develop a standard of care, as happens with other new medical treatments,
if none is set by legislators or regulatory agencies.102 The effect of any
single genetic modification on a person’s eventual traits is often
indeterminate and highly influenced by environmental factors, so in many
cases causation will be difficult to prove.103 The proximate cause
requirement may also exclude possible multigenerational injuries resulting
from harmful germline mutations.104 It is beyond the scope of this Issue
Brief to detail the solutions to these problems, but lines will need to be
drawn, as they have been in prior adaptations of tort law to new
technological possibilities.

CONCLUSION
CRISPR/Cas9 presents much therapeutic promise, but its use must
be regulated to prevent the sorts of experimental dangers that have plagued
the fertility industry. If federal and state legislatures are unwilling to step
in, tort duties will have to adapt—but only slightly—to cover the children
of CRISPR. Performing molecular surgery on a single-celled human
See Wendy C. Shapero, Does a Nonviable Fetus’s Right to Bring a Wrongful
Death Action Endanger a Woman’s Right to Choose?, 27 Sw. U. L. Rev. 325, 337
(2003) (arguing that attribution of personhood to unborn children undermines
abortion rights).
102
Marshall, supra note 96, at 1295–96, 1304.
103
Id. at 1297, 1310.
104
Id. at 1298, 1326.
101
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being, so that it will develop into a healthy baby, is a different type of
medical intervention than malpractice law was created to address, but the
timeless tort principles of compensating victims and deterring bad acts
require that, if legislatures do not act to protect these children, courts do.

